In this paper we ask whether, given a stock market and an illiquid derivative, there exists arbitrage-free prices at which an utility-maximizing agent would always want to buy the derivative, irrespectively of his own initial endowment of derivatives and cash.
Introduction
The problem of valuation of a non-traded contingent claim has always been of central importance in mathematical finance. One can distinguish between two fundamentally different notions of price: one inherent to the market, and one dependent on the specific investor. If a security was sold at an 'unreasonable' price, any investor could lock in a riskless profit. Even worse, as long as an investor could be considered infinitesimally small with respect to the size of the market, he could create a 'money pump' and make this riskless profit arbitrarily big. These considerations lead to the fecund concept of arbitrage-free price, which prescribes a necessary condition for a market model to be viable.
Fruitful as it was, this notion is of little use to an investor when the mathematical idealization of a complete market falls short of accurately describing reality. Given a nonreplicable security, the market mechanism is not sufficient to determine an interval I of 'threshold' prices such that any agent should buy at a price smaller than every p ∈ I, sell at a price greater than every p ∈ I, and do nothing at any price p ∈ I. Indeed, since the buying Date: May 2, 2014. We thank Dmitry Kramkov and anonymous referees for their valuable comments. ‡ University of Vienna, Faculty of Mathematics, email: pietro.siorpaes@univie.ac.at. or selling at any arbitrage-free price could lead both to a loss or to a gain, the attitude of the agent towards risk must be taken into consideration to decide what he should do at any such price. Intuitively, the interval of threshold prices should depend on the investor and his initial wealth, and it should be contained in the interval of arbitrage-free prices.
The classical approach in mathematical finance is to assume that the preferences of the agent are determined by the maximal expected utility u(x, q) that he can obtain by investing in the market an initial capital x if holding an endowment consisting of q illiquid contingent claims. Pricing rules derived from u (x, q) are called utility-based, and they form the prevailing paradigm in the valuation of contingent claims: see for example Davis (1995) , Frittelli (2000) , Foldes (2000) , Hodges and Neuberger (1989) , Karatzas and Kou (1996) , Kallsen (2002) , Hobson (2005) , Henderson and Hobson (2004) , Hugonnier et al. (2005) , Kramkov and Sîrbu (2006) .
We will consider the notion of marginal (utility-based) price at (x, q), which is defined as a price p such that the (utility-maximizing) agent with initial endowment (x, q) if given the opportunity to trade the contingent claim at price p would neither buy nor sell any. So marginal prices are precisely the 'threshold' prices previously mentioned; moreover, they are defined also when considering multiple contingent claims at once. The idea underlying this valuation principle is well known in economics: see for example Hicks (1956) . This paper is concerned with the investigation of whether all arbitrage-free prices are obtained by utility maximization. More precisely, we ask if there is a 'bad' subset of arbitrage-free prices which are never marginal prices, irrespectively of the investor and his endowment, or if all arbitrage-free prices are equally 'realistic'. And if they are, are they simply parameterized by the initial endowment, or does the preference structure of the investor matter, discriminating between which arbitrage-free prices are among his marginal prices and which arise only because of somebody else? To our knowledge these matters have not been previously investigated.
What we find is that arbitrage-free prices always come from utility maximization; moreover, it is enough to consider any (one) agent. Although it may sound intuitive that there exists no arbitrage-free price at which every agent should buy (or sell), we recall that, in many occasions, the marginal price at (x, 0) is unique and does not depend on x nor on the utility function (see Karatzas and Kou (1996) ). Thus, to recover all arbitrage-free prices it is sometimes not enough to consider all possible risk aversions: we must also take non-zero random endowments. If we do so, it then turns out that we do not need to consider many agents, nor special ones: any (one) utility would do. In other words, we show that there do not exist arbitrage-free prices at which an utility-maximizing agent would always want to buy (or sell) the derivative, irrespectively of his own initial endowment.
However, as we show with an example, there is a very delicate point: one can not a priori discard initial endowments on the boundary of the domain of the utility. This will force us to carefully reconsider the framework of Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004) , on which we rely, and to extend it by including all initial endowments with finite utility u (not just the ones in the interior).
Another objective is to prove that marginal prices are compatible with the market mechanism, i.e., they never allow for an arbitrage. This is important since a negative answer would seriously undermine the legitimacy of this useful concept of price. Karatzas and Kou (1996) also study this problem, although in a different setting.
We also investigate a number of properties of marginal prices, with special emphasis on the peculiarities which arise when dealing with endowments on the boundary of the domain of u, as these points are essential to answer positively our main question. As shown by Karatzas and Kou (1996) (and, in our framework, by Hugonnier et al. (2005) ), under appropriate assumptions, the marginal price at (x, 0) is unique; so if an agent has no initial endowment of illiquid contingent claims, the interval I of marginal prices collapses to a point, a particularly pleasant situation. In stark contrast to this, we prove that marginal prices based at a point (x, q) on the boundary, if they exist, are never unique; we also characterize their existence, and show how to compute them. Moreover, we give an explicit example of non-uniqueness where the set of marginal prices contains an interval that has an arbitrage price as an end-point. We then prove that this considerably quirky behavior is a general fact; in particular, given an investor with an endowment on the boundary, there always is an arbitrage price p such that the agent would choose not to trade in the derivative even if this one was being sold at a price arbitrarily close to p! Thus, one is left with a choice: either to restrict the attention to the well behaved marginal prices based at endowments in the interior of the domain of u (in which case however arbitrage-free prices may not come from utility maximization), or to consider also marginal prices with awkward properties.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the model we work in, and in Section 3 we state our main theorems. Then, in Section 4 we show with an explicit example what can go wrong, and in Section 5 we present a useful characterization of arbitrage-free prices. Finally, in Section 6 we obtain that the maximal expected utility u(x, q) is an upper semi-continuous function, in Section 7 we prove our first main theorem, and in Section 8 we derive a formula for marginal utility-based prices and we prove our second main theorem.
The model
We use the same model of an agent investing in a financial market as Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004) , and the same notations; however, we have to consider slightly more general random endowments, or our main result would not hold (see Section 4). We thus present only a very brief introduction to the model, referring to Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004) for additional details and discussions, and pointing out the few instances where we differ from it. We consider a model of a financial market composed of a savings account with zero interest rate, and d stocks with price S = (S i ) d i=1 . We assume that S is a locally-bounded 1 semi-martingale on a filtered probability space (Ω, F , F, P) whose filtration F = (F t ) t∈ [0,T ] satisfies the usual conditions. The wealth X of a (self-financing) portfolio (x, H) evolves in time as the stochastic integral
where H is assumed to be a predictable S -integrable process. We denote by X(x) the set of non-negative wealth processes whose initial value is equal to x ≥ 0, and by M the family of equivalent local martingale measures; we assume that
1 This assumption is not really necessary, as the results in Kramkov and Schachermayer (1999) , Kramkov and Schachermayer (2003) , Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004) , Delbaen and Schachermayer (1997) The utility function U is assumed to be strictly concave, strictly increasing and continuously differentiable on (0, ∞) and to satisfy Inada conditions:
Differently from Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004) , it will be convenient for us to consider U as defined on the whole real line. We want its extension to be concave and upper semicontinuous, and (2.2) implies that there is only one possible choice: we define U(x) to be −∞ for x in (−∞, 0), and to equal U(0+) at x = 0.
In this paper we will be concerned with a family of non-traded European contingent claims whose payoff f = ( f j ) n j=1 is dominated by the final value of a non-negative wealth process X ′ , that is,
To rule out doubling strategies in the model, one has to impose some sort of boundedness condition on the allowed wealth processes. In the presence of contingent claims bounded with respect to some numraire (i.e., satisfying (2.3)), one should consider wealth processes that are admissible under some numraire; these can be characterized as follows. A process X in X(x) is said to be maximal if its terminal value cannot be dominated by that of any other process in X(x). A wealth process X is called acceptable if it admits a representation of the form X = X ′ − X ′′ , where X ′ is a non-negative wealth process and X ′′ is a maximal wealth process.
Consider an agent with an initial endowment consisting of a cash amount x and a quantity q of contingent claims f . If the agent followed the strategy H his wealth process would be X = x+ H ·S and his final wealth X T +q f (throughout this paper we will use the notation vw for the dot product of the vectors v and w). If the contingent claims f cannot be traded and all the agent can do is to invest in the stocks and the bond, then his maximal expected utility will be Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004) , we define u for every (x, q) ∈ R × R n ). Clearly, if the wealth process does not satisfy X T + q f ≥ 0, the corresponding expected utility will be −∞, so we set
Notice that X(x, 0) = X(x) for all x ≥ 0. We will consider the convex cone
which is closed and contains (1, 0) in its interior K (see Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004, Lemma 6 and Lemma 1)). Being convex,K is then the closure of its interior K.
We point out that, if conditions (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) hold and u(x, 0) < ∞ for some
x > 0, then the concave function u defined on R n+1 by (2.4) never takes the value ∞ and
Suppose now that it becomes possible to trade the contingent claims at time 0 and at price p. Consider an agent with random endowment (x, q) who buys q ′ contingent claims, spending q ′ p := n j=1 q ′ j p j . If he then invests the remaining wealth x−q ′ p dynamically into the stocks and bond following the strategy H, his wealth process will be X = x−q ′ p+(H·S ) and his final wealth will be X T + (q + q ′ ) f .
Of course, we want to rule out arbitrage possibilities in the expanded market. We will say that p is an arbitrage-free price for the European contingent claims f if any portfolio with zero initial capital and non-negative final wealth has identically zero final wealth, and we will denote by P the set of arbitrage-free prices; so, we set
Consider now an agent with utility U and with corresponding maximal expected utility u given by (2.4), and fix a point (x, q) in {u > −∞}. We will say that, p is a marginal (utility-based) price at (x, q) for f relative to U if the agent with initial endowment (x, q) given the opportunity to trade the contingent claims f at time zero at price p would neither buy nor sell any. We will denote by P(x, q; U) (or simply P(x, q)) the set of marginal prices of f at (x, q) ∈ {u ∈ R}; i.e., we set
Intuition suggested that in the previous definition we exclude a priori the points (x, q) in {u = −∞}; our main result will show that indeed this is a good choice.
Statement of the main theorem
In this section we state our main results; our first objective is to answer to the following questions:
(1) Can one span all arbitrage-free prices using marginal utility-based prices? In particular, does one need to consider the marginal utility-based prices at all points (x, q) in {u > −∞}, or is it enough to consider the 'nicer' points in the interior?
Does one have to take the prices relative to all possible utilities, or to some subfamily, or is it enough to consider any one utility function?
(2) It is true that all marginal utility-based prices are arbitrage-free?
We now need to introduce some more (standard) notation. We set
and we denote with V the convex conjugate of U, i.e.,
Following Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004) , we will denote by w the value function of the problem of optimal investment without the European contingent claims, and byw its dual value function; in other words
Following Delbaen and Schachermayer (1997) , we will say that a wealth process X is workable if both X and −X are acceptable, and following Hugonnier et al. (2005) we will say that a random variable g is replicable if there is an workable process X such that X T = g. Provided that it exists, such a process X is unique. To simplify some proofs we will also assume that (3.4) for any non-zero q ∈ R n the random variable q f is not replicable;
we remark however that most of our result are clearly valid without this assumption (for reasons explained in Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004, Remark 6) ).
The following theorem constitutes our first main result. In other words
where u is the function defined in (2.4).
Theorem 3.1 (which we will prove in Section 7) says in particular that marginal prices are always arbitrage free, and to recover all arbitrage-free prices with marginal prices there is no need to consider multiple utilities, nor any special one: any one utility function will do!
We will see in Section 4 that, to obtain a result like the above, it is not sufficient to consider the points (x, q) in the interior K of {u > −∞}; this is why we are forced to extend the framework of Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004) . This leads us to study marginal prices based at boundary points, which turn out to behave quite unexpectedly. What is perhaps their most quirky property is described in our second main theorem, where by [p 0 , p) we denote the segment from p 0 to p, excluding p. 
An illuminating example
We will now construct explicitly an illuminating example which shows why we need all endowments with finite utility to prove Theorem 3.1, and illustrates how a number of intuitive statements about marginal prices fail to be true for prices based at boundary points, clarifying in particular why Theorem 3.2 holds.
We will denote by (1, p) ⊥ the set of vectors in R n+1 orthogonal to (1, p) . Given any
x ∈ R and the setK defined in (2.5), if we define Let us now build an example of the following counter-intuitive situation: an arbitragefree price p and a maximal expected utility function u that, for arbitrary x ∈ R s.t.K p (x) ∅, when restricted toK p (x) attains its maximum only at some point (x ′ , q ′ ) on the boundary ofK. This will give that p belongs to P(x ′ , q ′ ) but not to any P(x,q) with (x,q) in K (since (x,q) ∈K p (x +qp)).
Take U(x) = √ x, and consider a market with the bond, no stocks and one contingent claim whose law has density c(s + 1) The function h is concave, so its derivative is non-increasing. It follows that since
is strictly positive, h is strictly increasing on [−x, x], so its maximum is attained only at q = x. Thus p = 0 ∈ P belongs to P(x, x) (for any x > 0) but not to any P(x,q) with (x,q)
in K, proving that it is not enough to consider endowments in the interior of {u > −∞}.
This example also illustrates how the uniqueness of marginal utility-based prices fails on the boundary; let us show that indeed (−1, 0) ⊆ P(x, x). If −1 < r < 0 we have that (draw a picture!)
It is clear 3 that the maximum of u on the set {(a, b) ∈K : a ≤ x} is attained at (x, x). Thus (4.2) implies that the vector (x, x) ∈K r (x(1 + r) ) is a maximizer of u onK r (x(1 + r)), i.e., r ∈ P(x, x).
In this example not only P(x, x) is not a singleton: it even contains a whole open interval of prices with one extreme being an arbitrage price. This is an example of the general behavior described in Theorem 3.2.
The inclusion (−1, 0] ⊆ P(x, x), valid for all x > 0, also shows that the same marginal price can correspond to multiple initial endowments. So marginal prices cannot be thought of as a parametrization-nor as a partition-of arbitrage-free prices, with the parameter being the initial endowment.
Observe how this example yields a function u which is finite and continuous onK.
While this is not true in general, we will see that u is always upper semi-continuous. 3 Indeed u(·, q) is obviously increasing, and we have seen above that the maximum of u on {x} × [−x, x] is attained at the point (x, x).
Characterizations of Arbitrage-Free Prices
We will need the following definition and technical lemma
Lemma 5.1. Assume condition (2.1). Then given any X ∈ X(x, q) there exists a workablẽ X ∈ X(x, q) such thatX T ≥ X T .
PROOF. Since C(x) is closed and bounded in L 0 (P) (see Kramkov and Schachermayer (1999, Proposition 3.1) ). Let X = X ′ − X ′′ be a decomposition of the acceptable process X ∈ X(x, q) into a nonnegative wealth process X ′ and a maximal process X ′′ , and define
The set B is then closed and bounded in L 0 (P) and so, as stated and proved in the course of the proof of lemma 4.3 in Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994) , B contains a maximal elementg. It follows that there exists a maximalX ′ ∈ X(x) such thatX ′ T =g ≥ X ′ T . Takẽ X :=X ′ − X ′′ , thenX is workable andX T ≥ X T , soX ∈ X(x, q).
We will denote byL the polar of −K, i.e., Clearly,L is a closed convex cone; we will denote its relative interior by L. The following facts will be used in the proof of Lemma 5.2. As shown in Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004, Lemma 7), assumptions (2.1), (2.3) and (3.4) imply that L is the interior ofL, and so Rockafellar (1970, Corollary 14.6 .1) implies thatK contains no line passing through the origin). We recall that the recession cone 4 rec(C) of a set C ∅ is defined as the set of all y such that x+ty ∈ C for all x ∈ C and t ≥ 0; we refer to Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 8.4 ) for the following fundamental property of recession cones: a closed convex set C ∅ is unbounded iff there exists a non-zero x ∈ rec(C). (5.4) Lemma 5.2. Assume conditions (2.1), (2.3) and (3.4) . Then the following are equivalent:
(1) p is an arbitrage-free price.
(2) (1, p) ∈ L.
(3) There exists an equivalent local martingale measure Q ∈ M that satisfies E Q [ f ] = p and such that the maximal process X ′ that appears in (2.3) is a uniformly integrable martingale under Q.
Moreover, if x ∈ R is such that the setK p (x) defined in (4.1) is non-empty, then its recession cone isK ∩ (1, p) ⊥ , and so another equivalent condition is
The previous lemma shows that item 3, which would have been a plausible alternative definition of arbitrage-free price (and was implicitly used in Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004) ), is actually equivalent to our definition.
PROOF. Item 2 implies item 4, as it follows from (5.3). To prove the opposite implication take (1, p) L, so that (5.3) implies that there exists a non-zero (x,q) ∈K such thatx + pq ≤ 0. We can then find a convex combination (x ′ , q ′ ) of (x,q) and (1, 0) which satisfies x ′ + pq ′ = 0, and so the non-zero 5 vector (x ′ , q ′ ) belongs toK ∩ (1, p) ⊥ ; thus, item 4 implies item 2. That item 2 implies item 3 is part of Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004, Lemma 8) , and that item 3 implies item 1 follows simply from the definition of X(x, q).
Finally, let us prove that item 1 implies item 2. Let p be an arbitrage-free price and assume that (x, q) ∈K and x + pq ≤ 0, let X ∈ X(x, q), X = x + H · S and define X ′ := −qp + H · S .
Then X ′ T + q f is the sum of the two non-negative quantities −qp − x and X T + q f . It follows that X ′ belongs to X(−qp, q), and so by no arbitrage X ′ T + q f = 0, which implies x + qp = 0 and X T + q f = 0. This proves that if (x, q) ∈K then x + qp ≥ 0 (so (1, p) ∈ −K o =L), and that if x + qp = 0 and X ∈ X(x, q) then X T + q f = 0. Since, we can assume that such an X is workable (thanks to lemma 5.1), it follows that if x + qp = 0 then −X ∈ X(−x, −q), proving that if (x, q) is inK and is orthogonal to (1, p) then (x, q) belongs toK ∩ (−K) = {0}.
Finally, let us assume thatK p (x) it non-empty, and show thatK ∩ (1, p) ⊥ is its recession cone, so that (5.4) will conclude the proof. SinceK p (x) is the set of points (a, b) ∈K 5 If the sum of two vectors a, b ∈K equals zero then a = −b ∈K ∩ (−K ) = {0}. whose dot product with (1, p) equals x,K ∩ (1, p) ⊥ is contained in the recession cone of K p (x). For the opposite inclusion assume that (a, b) belongs toK p (x) and (c, d) belongs to its recession cone, then for any n, (a, b) + n(c, d) belongs toK p (x), so (c, d) is orthogonal to (1, p) and (c, d) = lim n (a + nc, b + nd)/n ∈K.
Upper semicontinuity of u
Given an arbitrary vector (y, r) ∈ R n+1 , we denote by Y(y, r) the set of non-negative super-martingales Y ∈ Y(y) such that the inequality
holds true whenever (x, q) ∈K and X ∈ X(x, q). Clearly this set will be empty if (y, r) L , and it coincides with the set defined in Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004) since asking that (6.1) holds for all (x, q) ∈K is equivalent to asking that it holds for all (x, q) ∈ K. Let Analogously to (5.1) and following Kramkov and Schachermayer (1999) we define
Given two sequences of functions (g n ) n≥1 and ( f n ) n≥1 , we will say that ( f n ) n≥1 is a forward convex combination of (g n ) n≥1 if, for every n, f n is a (finite) convex combination of (g k ) k≥n . Lemma 6.1 . Assume that conditions (2.1) and (2.3) hold. Let g n ∈ C(x n , q n ) for some sequence (x n , q n ) converging to (x, q) . If a forward convex combination of (g n ) n≥1 converges almost surely to a random variable g, then g ∈ C(x, q). Analogously if a forward convex combination of h n ∈ D(y n , r n ) is converging almost surely to h and (y n , r n ) → (y, r), then h ∈ D(y, r).
PROOF. The first statement follows applying Fatou's lemma to the converging forward convex combination of (g n ) n≥1 to obtain E[gh] ≤ xy + qr for all (y, r) ∈L and h ∈ D(y, r), (6.5) so that g ∈ C(x, q) follows 'from Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004 1, q) , which trivially implies that g ∈ C(x, q) ).
The proof of the second statement follows analogously 'from Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004, Proposition 1, item 2)'; while this item is stated only for (y, r) ∈ L, clearly 7 it is actually valid with the same proof for any (y, r) ∈L. PROOF. One implication is trivial. For the vice versa, observe first that D(y, r) is not empty if (y, r) ∈ L, as this follows from Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004, Lemmas 8 and 9 ). If (y, r) is an arbitrary point inL then take (y n , r n ) ∈ L such that (y n , r n ) → (y, r) and choose h n ∈ D(y n , r n ) ⊆ D(sup n y n ). We can then apply Komlos' lemma to find a forward convex combination of (h n ) n≥1 converging to some random variable h, and apply Lemma 6.1 to show that h ∈ D(y, r).
The following theorem allows us to control the behavior of the maximal expected utility function u on the boundary of its domain. To prove Theorem 6.3 we will need the following fact, which was proved in the second half 8 of the proof of Kramkov and Schachermayer (2003, Lemma 1) under the assumption that lim x→∞ u(x)/x = 0, which is satisfied under our hyphotheses since 9 u ′ (∞) = 0 (as stated in Kramkov and Schachermayer (2003, Theorem 2) ) and lim x→∞ u(x)/x = u ′ (∞) (by l'Hospital's rule).
Remark 6.4. Assume that conditions (2.1),(2.2) hold, and that w(y) < ∞ for all y > 0.
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.3. To prove that u is upper semi-continuous let (x k , q k ) be a sequence converging to (x, q), assume without loss of generality that u(x k , q k ) > −∞ and take X k ∈ X(x k , q k ) such that u(x k , q k ) − 1/k ≤ E[U(X k T + q k f )]. Define g k := X k T + q k f and s := lim sup k u(x k , q k ). Passing to a subsequence without re-labelling we can assume that u(x k , q k ) converges to s, and so
.
If x ′ 0 is the initial value of the process X ′ appearing in (2.3) andx is the supremum of the bounded sequence
then assumption (2.3) implies that, for every m, g m ∈ C(x).
We can then apply Komlos' lemma to find a forward convex combination (g k ) k≥1 of (g k ) k≥1 which is converging almost surely to some random variable g. Then Lemma 6.1
gives that g ∈ C(x, q), and Jensen inequality yields
Since (g m ) m≥1 ⊆ C(x), Remark 6.4 says that the sequence (U(g m ) + ) m≥1 is uniformly integrable. Thus, Fatou's lemma and inequalities (6.6) and (6.7) imply that
which says that u is upper semi-continuous. If u(x, q) > −∞ then one can take (x k , q k ) = (x, q) in the above, and so (6.8) gives that there exists a maximizer to (2.4). Uniqueness follows from the strict concavity of U.
Proof of the first main theorem
We will repeatedly need the following simple observation. PROOF Theorem 6.3 yields the existence of a maximizer X(x, q) to (2.4), and Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004, Lemma 7) provides the existence of aX ∈ X(x,q) such that P(X T + q f > 0) > 0. Thus the following inequality holds
and it is a strict inequality with strictly positive probability. The thesis follows integrating the two sides of (7.1), since the right hand side is integrable and has integral u(x, q), and the left hand side has integral at most u(x + x,q + q).
In the next proof we will use (5.4) without further mention. (0) If (y, r) ∈ ∂u(x, q) then y > 0, since f (t) := u(t, q) is strictly increasing on [x, ∞) (by Lemma 7.1) and y ∈ ∂ f (0). We can then define p = r/y and Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 23 .9) implies that 0 ∈ A ⋆ p (∂u(x, q) ) ⊆ ∂ f p (0), i.e., p ∈ P(x, q).
For the opposite inclusion assume p ∈ P(x, q), so that by definition (x, q) ∈K and, by i.e., r − py = 0 for some (y, r) ∈ ∂u(x, q).
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2 By Corollary 8.1 there exists a (y 0 , r 0 ) ∈ ∂u(x, q) such that r 0 /y 0 = p 0 . The non-empty convex closed set ∂u(x, q) is unbounded (see Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 23.4) ), so (5.4) says that its recession cone contains a non-zero element (y, r). For t ≥ 0 define (8.2) (y t , r t ) := (y 0 , r 0 ) + t(y, r) ∈ ∂u(x, q), and notice that Corollary 8.1 implies that v t := r t /y t ∈ P(x, q). Since the function (y, r) → r/y, defined for y > 0, sends injectively segments into segments (see Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004, Section 2.3 .3)) and v t → r/y =: p as t → ∞, {v t : t ≥ 0} equals the segment [p 0 , p). We now only need to prove that p is not an arbitrage-free price. From (x, q) ).
Dividing times t and taking the limit as t → ∞ yields that 0 ≤ (y, r) ((a, b) − (x, q) ).
Thus, for any ε > 0 choosing (a, b) := (x/2, q/2) + ε(1, 0) ∈ K ⊆ {u > −∞} we get that (y, r)(x, q) ≤ 2εy. Sending ε to zero we obtain (y, r)(x, q) ≤ 0, and so (5.3) implies that (y, r) does not belong to L. Lemma 5.2 now concludes the proof.
Theorem 3.2 implies that marginal prices based at a point (x, q) on the boundary ofK, if they exist, are not unique. This raises the question of how to characterize the uniqueness of marginal prices based at all points, which is the content of the following corollary, where the function v is the convex conjugate of u (see Hugonnier and Kramkov (2004) ).
Corollary 8.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, the following are equivalent:
(1) At any (x, q) ∈ R × R n the set P(x, q; U) is either empty or a singleton.
(2) P(x, q; U) is a singleton at any (x, q) ∈ K, and is empty at any (x, q) K.
(3) u is continuously differentiable on K and the norm of its gradient |∇u(x, q)| converges to ∞ as (x, q) approaches the boundary of K.
(4) v is strictly convex on L.
PROOF In this proof we will use Corollary 8.1 without further mention. Theorem 3.2
shows that item 1 is equivalent to item 2. Since ∂u(K) = L (see Siorpaes (2013, Theorem 10, item 3)), item 3 is equivalent to item 4 (see Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 26.3) ). Finally, item 2 is equivalent to item 3, as it follows from Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 26 .1) and the fact that ∂u is single-valued iff P is single-valued (because y → v (y(1, p) ) is always strictly convex when (1, p) ∈ L = ∂u(K)).
